The Congo Crisis: America’s Misinterpretation of Patrice Lumumba

Shortly after independence from the Belgian government on June 30, 1960, political upheaval, civil unrest, and continual violence from mutiny was on the rise in the Congo. Rebellious troops created partial anarchy, to the extent that the British and French Embassies ordered non-essential personnel to evacuate. The Congolese soldiers demanded promotions and pay increases, while soldiers continued to mutiny Belgian officers. The Belgian government sent in 1,200 men to aid the 2,500 already in the country, stating that they would not intervene without specific request from the Congolese government[i]. Patrice Lumumba pointed out that Article Six of the Treaty of Friendship signed between Belgium and the Republic of the Congo gave the Belgians the right to intervene militantly only if specifically requested to do so by the Congolese Government. He said no request was ever made, therefore, their presence within the country was unwarranted[ii]. On July 10th Lumumba made an oral request for the UN assistance in restoring order[iii]. With the UN moving slowly to send assistance, the Congolese government through US Ambassador Timberlake, asked for U.S. assistance. President Eisenhower ruled out the use of U.S. forces under any circumstances including through the UN. Lumumba then appealed a second time to the UN but not simply for assistance, but to protect the Congo from Belgian military intervention; Lumumba was suspicious and distrustful of Belgian motives. With a suspicious and distrustful sentiment towards Belgian motives, coupled with slow UN action and a clear U.S. desire to not intervene, Lumumba and other Congolese officials stated that they might be forced to “ask for the intervention of the Soviet Union” if the Western camp did not stop “its aggression” against the Congo. President Eisenhower regarded Lumumba’s acceptance of Soviet planes and military aid in general as the last series of actions that proved Communist influence; CIA Director Allen Dulles at the time expressed his continuing concerns about military equipment and personnel in the Congo. Dulles then briefed President Eisenhower and the National Security Council about the situation in the Congo post-Mobutu coup (how Lumumba still posed a dangerous threat). Director Dulles implied that Lumumba needed to be “disposed of”, and the Eisenhower administration agreed[iv].

The decision to overthrow Patrice Lumumba and establish a pro-Western leader, particularly, Army Chief of Staff Joseph Mobutu was a problematic decision because in overthrowing a democratically elected official, American policy was supporting a soon to be kleptocrat that achieved short and medium accomplishments but not long-term achievements. The U.S.­—in attempting to protect their political and economic interest— violated democratic principles that were in line with American interest to maintain in the first place; particularly given that politically American decision makers were interested in aggressively prohibiting Communist influence from the Soviet Union within the Congo; then supporting a leader who undermines democratic principles is not only contradictory but completely undermines U.S. values. In analyzing this crisis, I recommend that the U.S. not directly aid in overthrowing Lumumba but instead better understand and empathize with Lumumba’s interest in Congolese democratic independence—in hopes that in doing this, the Congolese government would have worked with American interest apart from doing so through Mobutu. Which in turn would have prevented Lumumba from turning to the Soviet Union in the first place. President Eisenhower rebuked Lumumba for accepting Soviet aid and his response is revealing of Lumumba’s view towards the Soviet Union’s assistance: “Lumumba publicly rejected Eisenhower’s arguments at a press conference the following day. He thanked the Soviet government for its help and proclaimed defiantly that the Congo would accept aid from any source that was offered ‘without political conditions’”[v]; this theme of Lumumba prioritizing Congo assistance via wherever that comes from is continual and causes one to question American’s fear of his Soviet lean.

America aided in sending planes, but it could have done more, “. . . White House in Newport announced that President Eisenhower had categorically ruled out the use of U.S. troops in the Congo under any circumstances, including participation in a UN force” [vi]. But what is interesting is that decision makers knew the gravity of the situation in the Congo, which lead to the U.S. Navy sending light passenger planes and helicopters to the Congo from the Caribbean to help those that wanted to evacuate from the current unrest[vii]. If the U.S. could send assistance in helping to evacuate refugees or those that wanted to escape from the civil unrest, American decision makers could have sent other forms of assistance to Lumumba and the Congolese government during this particular time instead of air assistance for evacuation purposes. U.S. transport planes transported 2,522 soldiers from Tunisia, Morocco, and Ghana—these planes making other trips totaling to 211 flights to Leopoldville[viii]. With large American political and economic interest, one would think that American decision makers would attempt to be more aggressive in their intentions to help Lumumba apart from evacuation; the abundance of evacuation services did not help solve the civil crisis nor did it help mitigate the current crisis; President Eisenhower found it troubling that the Soviet Union supplied Lumumba with planes that flew Lumumba’s army into Katanga to prevent the succession, and yet U.S. transport planes were active in the area but not in the interest of Lumumba and the Congolese government; the perception of Lumumba in the eyes of American decision makers was key to this decision.

The perception of Lumumba in particular was based mainly on their view of him suffering from “personal psychopathology”, viewing his nationalism as erratic and unstable behavior[ix]. I believe American decision makers conflated Lumumba’s rationalism with his radicalism and unorthodox personality, which largely distorted their view of him, ultimately viewing his ideology as anti-Western, therefore, not worthy of sufficient aid. Following a radio speech in July 1960 after an appeal to the Soviet Union, Lumumba states his view towards Communism:

We have said that if there were no means of obtaining satisfaction immediately, we were going to appeal to Soviet and Afro-Asian troops. We will never be Communists and we are not Communists, contrary to the campaign of destruction and obstruction that the enemies of our independence have led across the country. We are just Africans. We don’t want to undergo external influence, we want nothing from either doctrines of Western importation, or Russian, or American, The Congo remains the Congo. . . We don’t want to get out of one dictatorship to fall under another dictatorship[x].

Ambassador Timberlake and most American decision makers at the time believed Lumumba to be “personally unstable” “erratic,” “unpredictable,” “self-contradictory,” and overall, just a mentally incoherent individual; this notion stemming from the day of independence where his remarks during the festivities were considered wary and had showed his unreliability and inconsistency. Lumumba’s tendencies might have been unpopular or unorthodox, but his foundational beliefs and stance was certainly upon Congolese independence and unification. Ultimately, Lumumba’s personality blinded American decision makers from seeing his passion for “Congolese sovereignty and unity”. A qualified official during that time asked a valid question—which pertains to Lumumba’s acceptance of Soviet planes— that American decision makers were certainly cognizant of but grossly rejected, “What alternatives were open to Lumumba? Fold his arms and hope that sooner or later negotiations might succeed; and meanwhile? Face the fragmentation of his government’s authority and power, as well as his own”[xi]. It’s possible that American decision makers were aware of this but did not see it within their interest or probably did not care, but I believe had decision makers been more Congo-independence focused, rather than Soviet alarmed, they would have seen Lumumba’s zeal being superior to Soviet enticement.

The U.S. also overemphasized using military means within the Congo to combat Soviet forces, when in fact, the real conflict was civil in nature—Ernest Lefever wrote during this period: “The real Communist danger was the subversive exploitation of civil strife and chaos, and not in a direct military confrontation as implied in some American statements”[xii]. In overemphasizing military means, the U.S. missed out on an opportunity to better aid in the civil crisis—the focus of American decision makers being fixed on Soviet actions rather than Congolese interests. This statement from one key American official affirms this: “There was a lot of thinking the Soviets would take advantage better of chaos, and not us.”[xiii]. This mentality in decision makers prioritizes the danger of Soviet forces, rather than Congolese aid. Continuing this notion, American decision makers overestimated communist threat and in turn underestimated long-term effects of relationship with the Congo and the greater African continent. Former CIA Director Allen W. Dulles affirmed this notion years later in an interview, stating “Well, I think we overrated the Soviet danger, let’s say, in the Congo. They went in there with a great fanfare. . ..  and it looked as though they were going make a serious attempt to at take-over in the Belgian Congo. Well, it didn’t work that way at all”[xiv].

In attempting to hide their intentions and actions under the guise of the UN and Belgian forces, American decisionmakers relied too heavily on the United Nations to intervene in the Congo crisis. Even the Soviet Union relied upon the United Nations but managed to take action in helping Lumumba: “Ironically, both the Russians and the Americans were counting on the United Nations to deal with the Congo issue—although the two great powers were expecting somewhat different results from the UN operation, and one or the other was bound to be disappointed”[xv]. Lumumba and the Congolese government warned beforehand after appealing to the UN that if their response was slow, that they would seek assistance from others, “particularly in the militarily crucial area of long-range transportation”[xvi]. The American position supported the Belgian forces of keeping forces in the Congo (which was supposed to be until UN forces showed up, but it was later revealed that it was because of their suspicion of Lumumba’s Communist lean). America decision makers hid behind its NATO reflex in stating that other colonialist allies are supporting Belgium, using this treaty as a shield[xvii]. America supplied UN transport, which ultimately means that the U.S. had more power in the situation than stated, but instead relied on other actors; the U.S. should have been firm in assisting Lumumba, which would have protected their interest, while prohibiting Soviet intervention.

Endnotes

[i] Kalb, G. Madeline. The Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa — from Eisenhower to Kennedy, Macmillan Publishing Co., INC 1982, 6.

[ii] Office of the Historian, Foreign Service Institute. FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1958–1960, AFRICA, VOLUME. XIV, July 27, 1960.

[iii] Kalb, G. Madeline. The Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa — from Eisenhower to Kennedy, Macmillan Publishing Co., INC 1982, 7.

[iv] Kalb, G. Madeline. The Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa — from Eisenhower to Kennedy, Macmillan Publishing Co., INC 1982, 102.

[v] Kalb, G. Madeline. The Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa — from Eisenhower to Kennedy, Macmillan Publishing Co., INC 1982, 78.

[vi]  Kalb, G. Madeline. The Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa — from Eisenhower to Kennedy, Macmillan Publishing Co., INC 1982, 9.

[vii] Kalb, G. Madeline. The Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa — from Eisenhower to Kennedy, Macmillan Publishing Co., INC 1982, 9.

[viii] Kalb, G. Madeline. The Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa — from Eisenhower to Kennedy, Macmillan Publishing Co., INC 1982, 19.

[ix] Weissman, R. Stephen. American Foreign Policy in The Congo 1960-1964, Cornell University Press 1974, 257-258.

[x] Weissman, R. Stephen. American Foreign Policy in The Congo 1960-1964, Cornell University Press 1974, 264.

[xi] Weissman, R. Stephen. American Foreign Policy in The Congo 1960-1964, Cornell University Press 1974, 258

[xii] Weissman, R. Stephen. American Foreign Policy in The Congo 1960-1964, Cornell University Press 1974, 279

[xiii] Weissman, R. Stephen. American Foreign Policy in The Congo 1960-1964, Cornell University Press 1974, 52.

[xiv] Weissman, R. Stephen. American Foreign Policy in The Congo 1960-1964, Cornell University Press 1974, 280.

[xv] Kalb, G. Madeline. The Congo Cables, The Cold War in Africa — from Eisenhower to Kennedy, Macmillan Publishing Co., INC 1982, 16.

[xvi] Weissman, R. Stephen. American Foreign Policy in The Congo 1960-1964, Cornell University Press 1974, 74.

[xvii] Weissman, R. Stephen. American Foreign Policy in The Congo 1960-1964, Cornell University Press 1974, 74.